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Geographically concentrated industry activity creates pools of skilled 
labor and specialized suppliers, and increases opportunities for knowledge 
spillovers. The strategic value of these agglomeration economies may vary 
by firm, depending upon the relative value of each economy, and upon 
firm and agglomeration economy traits. To better determine when a firm 
will be attracted to agglomeration economies, we develop a three-layer 
framework. The first layer assesses the relative importance of skilled 
labor, suppliers, and knowledge spillovers. The second layer considers 
whether firms can benefit from geographic concentration without co-
locating. The final layer examines why some firms are more inclined to 
co-locate than others based upon firm and agglomeration economy traits. 
We test our framework on the U.S. location choices of new manufacturing 
entrants between 1985 and 1994 and find that firms are far more attracted 
to skilled labor and specialized suppliers than they are to potential 
knowledge spillovers, even in R&D intensive industries. We also find that 
leading firms will be more attracted to pools of labor, suppliers, and 
potential knowledge spillovers when their own contributions are less 
fungible, and cannot be easily leveraged for strategic advantage by 
proximate competitors.  
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1. Introduction 
Marshall (1920)  suggests that locations thick with similar activity generate valuable 
agglomeration economies for firms, namely better access to skilled labor (labor market pooling), 
specialized suppliers (shared inputs), and knowledge spillover from competing firms. As a result, 
firms’ location choices may create competitive advantage by improving access to key resources. 
More recently, business research has begun exploring why these agglomeration economies are 
more valuable to some firms than to others. Notably, Shaver and Flyer (2000) argue that large 
firms may be less inclined to agglomerate because their presence would dramatically increase 
local  economic activity, thereby reducing costs for neighboring competitors. Addressing 
potential knowledge spillovers specifically, Alcácer and Chung (2007) argue that the cost of 
knowledge lost  to competitors depends upon whether competitors can absorb and use  that 
knowledge. When competitors cannot  leverage the knowledge gleaned from technically 
advanced firms, industry leaders are free to enjoy the benefits of agglomeration without the 
attendant risk.  
In order to  more fully  understand  the  firm-level implications of agglomeration 
economies, and better predict when a particular firm will co-locate, we develop a three-layer 
framework of determinants. The first layer prioritizes the relative value of labor pools, 
specialized suppliers and knowledge inflows using the well-developed economics literature on 
production functions. The second layer assesses whether firms can take advantage of 
agglomeration economies without co-locating with firms that create those economies. The final 
layer examines differences between firms and among the three agglomeration economies to see 
if firm or agglomeration traits change the likelihood of aiding neighboring competitors. Larger 
firms or technical leader firms, for example, might be more likely to contribute resources to   2   
competitors through agglomeration economies, giving them less incentive to join a geographic 
concentration in which their firm’s contribution would be particularly valuable to others. At the 
same time, factor inputs created by each agglomeration economy  –  the intermediate goods 
created by pools of specialized suppliers, for example – may be easier or harder for firms to 
access depending upon the extent of market imperfection. We argue that some factor inputs are 
more difficult to obtain through market transactions because of market imperfections, making it 
less likely that competing firms can leverage them for advantage.  
We introduce measures for each agglomeration economy –  share of industry 
employment, supplier-industry activity, and industry patent stock – which parallel recent work in 
economics.
1
We test our hypotheses with a sample of first-time foreign entrants
 For key dimensions of firm heterogeneity, we pair each agglomeration economy 
with a corresponding firm trait: the contribution  to pools of skilled labor and specialized 
suppliers  will  change with firms’ relative economic output; the contribution  to knowledge 
spillovers will change with firms’ technical capabilities. For agglomeration economy 
heterogeneity, we expect that factor markets for knowledge spillovers will be the most imperfect, 
followed by specialized suppliers and then skilled labor. Accounting for both firm and 
agglomeration economy heterogeneity allows us to predict when various firms might be more or 
less attracted to a particular agglomeration economy. 
2  to U.S. 
manufacturing industries between 1985 and 1994.
3
                                                 
1 For example, Rosenthal and Strange (2001) examine differences in extent of agglomeration in U.S. manufacturing 
using levels of educational attainment, manufactured inputs as share of output value, and innovations per value of 
output. Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) examine co-location of U.S. manufacturing industries using similarity in 
employment category arrays, extent of input-output links, and extent of patent citation links. 
  We find that industry employment  and 
2 We focus on first-time entrants because incumbent firms have prior investments that may affect subsequent 
location choices and create dependence among observations by the same firm. 
3 By looking at location choice, we evaluate how much value firms expect to gain by agglomerating (or not). The 
actual value might be evaluated after a move by examining performance measures, such as productivity. Examining   3   
supplier activity are about ten times more attractive than industry patent stocks, suggesting that, 
on average, firms are relatively unconcerned about gaining knowledge from nearby competitors 
(knowledge inflows). Similarly, we find that large firms are more wary of co-locating in the 
presence of skilled labor pools than in the presence of specialized suppliers –  presumably 
because competing firms can hire from pools of skilled labor more readily than they can leverage 
the supplier base developed by other firms. 
In the next section we consider firms’ strategic reactions to agglomeration economies in 
three stages. First, we establish the baseline attractiveness of each agglomeration economy. 
Second, we argue that some agglomeration economies are more location-specific, providing 
stronger incentive to co-locate. Third, we propose that firm and agglomeration economy 
heterogeneity will impact the propensity to co-locate. In later sections we explain our data, 
methods, and results. Finally, we highlight our findings and discuss implications for firm 
strategy. 
2. Firm asymmetry for agglomeration economies 
Marshall (1920) suggests three factors that reduce production costs for agglomerated 
firms: larger pools of skilled labor, more specialized suppliers, and knowledge inflows from 
competitors. The first two develop when increased local demand encourages specialization. 
Unskilled workers are more likely to seek specialized training when local jobs are concentrated 
in the same industry. In turn, firms save time and money they would otherwise spend on training. 
By the same logic, suppliers working alongside a concentration of same-industry firms are more 
likely to make industry-specific investments, reducing transportation and coordination costs for 
the firms they supply. Marshall’s third agglomeration economy considers how firms combine 
                                                                                                                                                             
location choices is crucial because performance is endogenous, in that actual performance will be partially driven by 
initial location choices.   4   
inputs. Firms with similar products may have very different production processes, varying by 
capital and labor intensity, by how capital is paired with labor, and by how labor is organized 
and trained, among other things. Some of these processes will be more productive than others, 
and over time these best practices may spread to neighboring firms, improving efficiency and 
lowering costs. 
As a source of reduced costs, Marshall’s agglomeration economies have important 
implications for firm strategy: firms that benefit from agglomeration economies will have an 
advantage over competitors. Whether a firm does, in fact, benefit from an agglomeration 
economy will depend upon three issues (see Figure 1). First, skilled labor, specialized suppliers, 
and knowledge spillover have different values to different firms. Second, the level of localization 
required to access a specific agglomeration economy will vary. Third, the value of a particular 
agglomeration economy will most  likely vary depending upon  both  firm  and agglomeration 
economy heterogeneity.  
2.1 Are some agglomeration economies more intensively used? 
Before exploring firms’ strategic response to each of Marshall’s agglomeration 
economies, we must  determine  which of them firms  value  most.  Because  trained labor, 
specialized suppliers, and knowledge inflows can each lower firms’ costs, we assume that, on 
average, firms will be drawn to all three. We expect the attractiveness of each economy will vary 
by its corresponding importance to a firm’s production processes: the more important the input 
for creation of the final output, the more valuable the corresponding agglomeration economy.  
To assess labor, suppliers, and knowledge as inputs, we use the empirical research on 
firms’ production functions as a guide. Fundamental work by Griliches and Mairesse (1983) and 
Hall (1993) link the set of factor inputs consumed by firms to the output produced. Production   5   
functions typically include measures of capital, labor, materials, and R&D. These authors have 
estimated the cost share, or weights, of these factor  inputs, which reflect their relative 
contribution to output. While there is certainly variation by industry, on average the estimates of 
these weights are largest for materials, followed by capital and labor, with R&D last. For 
example, when looking across all U.S. manufacturing from 1974-1990, Nadiri and Kim (1996) 
report cost shares for capital, labor, materials, and R&D of 13.5%, 14.1%, 64.2%, and 8.2%, 
respectively. These weights suggest that materials would be most important for firms’ productive 
processes, followed by capital and labor, and then by R&D.  
These production function weights give us a baseline from which we can determine the 
relative attractiveness of various agglomeration economies. Assuming that the more important 
the input, the more important the corresponding agglomeration economy, we would initially 
expect firms to value specialized suppliers (the source of materials) most, followed by skilled 
labor, and finally, R&D activity.  
2.2 Do firms need to co-locate to access agglomeration benefits? 
The next step is considering how the relative importance of each agglomeration economy 
will affect firms’ location choices. Initially, we would expect the relative draw of each economy 
to correspond to the value firms place on that economy’s factor input – the corresponding 
production function weights. This baseline would be affected by the degree to which each 
economy is location specific. Where geographic proximity is necessary to leverage advantage 
from an economy's factor inputs, firms would have stronger incentive to co-locate.  
Consider materials, for example. While materials have a large production weight, 
indicating their importance as a factor input, firms can source materials from a distance. The 
1993 Commodity Flow Survey from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics shows that the   6   
distance travelled for the average of all commodities was 424 miles (with this distance growing 
in subsequent surveys). While commodity producers may be found only in certain locations, the 
market for commodities and their transportation is efficient. In contrast, costs for sourcing 
workers distantly are prohibitive. Workers are unlikely to commute more than a couple of hours 
between work and home. The U.S. Census County-to-County Worker Flow Files show that the 
average commute to work was 22.4 minutes in 1990 (and 25.5 minutes in 2000); and that less 
than three percent of workers travelled more than 90 minutes between work and home. Skilled 
labor for any given industry will likely be located in only a few locations, and labor markets 
across locations may be less efficient if people are hesitant to relocate. For example, contrary to 
common belief, geographic mobility in the U.S. is low. According to the Current Population 
Survey conducted by the Census Bureau since 1948, 17 percent of the population moved on 
average from 1985 to 1994 in the U.S. Of those movers, 36 percent moved to another county and 
16 percent moved to another state. Similarly, there is growing recognition that knowledge is 
somewhat localized because it has  tacit components.  For example, Adams and Jaffe (1996) 
demonstrate that localized R&D spending (within 100 miles) improves  proximate 
establishments’ total-factor-productivity substantially more than distant R&D activity.  
Because worker commuting patterns and R&D spillovers are more geographically 
bounded than the flow of commodities, the benefits emanating from pools of skilled labor and 
potential knowledge inflows will be more localized than the benefits from specialized suppliers. 
As a result, we expect that the production weights for labor and R&D activity understate firms’ 
incentives to co-locate for skilled labor and knowledge inflows, while the weight for materials 
overstates the importance of specialized suppliers. But how large are these under- and over-
statements?   7   
To better benchmark the combined impact of production weights and location specificity 
on the draw of each agglomeration economy, we turn to prior empirical work. Rosenthal and 
Strange (2001) examine differences in the extent of agglomeration in U.S. manufacturing at the 
industry level and find that the explanatory power of Marshall’s agglomeration economies differs 
when applied at three geographic levels. Labor-market pooling explains industry agglomeration 
at zip code, county, and state levels; access to intermediate inputs explains agglomeration only at 
the state level; and potential knowledge spillovers have effect at the zip code level. Applied to 
our setting, this study suggests a greater importance for suppliers and labor than for knowledge 
inflows, but the relative merits of skilled labor and specialized suppliers remain unclear. For that 
reason, we are agnostic about this particular bilateral comparison, and work with two bilateral 
rankings instead. More formally: 
H1. Skilled labor (share of same industry employment) and specialized suppliers (share 
of supplier-industry employment) will be more attractive than potential knowledge 
spillover (share of industry R&D activity). 
2.3 Why are some firms more likely to pursue agglomeration economies? 
The first and second layers of the framework assess the relative attraction of each 
agglomeration economy for the average firm. Our final step explores why and how individual 
firms will vary in their propensity to co-locate for each economy. With each economy offering 
reduced costs to proximate firms, we might expect geographic concentration to be universally 
appealing. To understand why this might not be the case, we examine how much proximate firms 
contribute to agglomeration economies, and whether their competitors can make use of those 
contributions.   
Shaver and Flyer (2000) make two fundamental observations about firms’ contributions 
to proximate competitors and the impact of those contributions on co-location. First, firms not   8   
only benefit from agglomeration economies, but they also contribute to them. It is the collective 
activity of proximate firms that forms, maintains, and grows these public goods. Second, firms 
differ in how much they gain from and contribute to the pool. Shaver and Flyer suggest the 
benefits of agglomerating are asymmetric – that larger firms contribute more to the pool, and 
gain less, than their smaller competitors.
4
Because Shaver and Flyer address Marshall’s agglomeration economies in aggregate, two 
issues must be resolved before applying their reasoning to individual agglomeration economies. 
First, they do not provide guidance on whether firms' behavior is similar for all types of 
agglomeration economies. Second, as a consequence, they cannot identify which firm traits may 
be more relevant for each agglomeration economy.  
 As a result, the net benefit of agglomerating may be far 
less for some firms than for others. In some cases, the net benefit may actually be negative, 
creating incentive to avoid co-location entirely. Specifically, they show that while co-location 
improves survival for average-sized firms, larger entrants are much less likely to locate near 
competitors.  
To address the first issue we start with Alcácer and Chung (2007) who argue that, in 
addition to how much a firm contributes to agglomeration economies, one must consider the 
usefulness of that contribution. Agglomeration economies offer potential benefits, but not all 
proximate firms will be able to benefit. Alcácer and Chung make this point in relation to 
knowledge spillovers. They argue that knowledge spills are not easy to pick up: firms may create 
a pool of potential knowledge spillovers, but all potential spillovers are not accessible or useful 
to all firms. Knowledge is difficult to transfer at arms length by virtue of its tacit nature, which 
                                                 
4 A manifestation of this is that large firms can sometimes command an entourage of followers. The infrastructure 
and markets created by industry agglomeration would be less valuable to these firms, giving them more latitude to 
locate away from competitors. Martin, Mitchell and Swaminathan (1995) found this to be the case among some 
Japanese automotive manufacturers, who were able to locate away from Detroit because their suppliers followed 
them.   9   
makes it less useful without repeated contact. The firms most able to overcome this difficulty and 
realize the benefits of potential knowledge spills are firms that  have the capacity to absorb 
knowledge gleaned from more-sophisticated competitors. When competitors cannot materially 
benefit from knowledge outflows, the knowledge has limited usefulness; therefore the risk is 
reduced for the technically advanced firm that leaks that knowledge. As a result, advanced firms 
can readily locate among less-advanced competitors. 
We generalize this limited-usefulness argument and apply it across  the three 
agglomeration economies. These economies are potentially useful to firms because they create 
pools of factor inputs. However, accessing factor inputs involves exchange through the 
marketplace. If the market is imperfect, the factor input becomes difficult to access. A firm that 
contributes to an agglomeration economy that other firms cannot readily access through the 
marketplace is not risking its competitive advantage.  
We expect labor markets to be the least imperfect – and therefore labor will be the easiest 
factor to access – followed by specialized suppliers and knowledge inflows from competitors. 
Labor markets are relatively easy to penetrate because they are thick with information. First, 
firms can clearly specify their labor needs: professions, job categories, and duties are fairly well 
defined.
5
                                                 
5 The market is so well defined that the Bureau of Labor Statistics maintains the “Standard Occupation 
Classification” with 820 classifications covering all possible professions. 
 Prices (wages) are readily set by supply and demand in the marketplace. Additionally, 
labor quality is somewhat observable from education, training, and relevant experience. Because 
of such market transparency, firms looking to hire new employees face few hurdles. Among 
professions normally employed, firms should be relatively well equipped to assess, hire, and 
integrate individuals into their organizations. Thus any contributions that firms make to enlarge 
and deepen labor pools should be useful for neighboring firms.   10   
 The market for suppliers’ services can be more imperfect and thus less accessible for 
firms. While some services can be tightly specified, requiring only a one-time transaction; other 
services are more involved and difficult to completely specify ex-ante – for example when a 
supplier provides services over time for an ongoing  project. In addition, supplier services 
received by one firm might not be suitable for another due to differences in business processes 
and routines. Due to this lack of standardization, pricing becomes more idiosyncratic. These 
challenges mean that the ability to identify good suppliers, engage them, and work successfully 
with them is not a given. As such, contributions made to pools of specialized suppliers may not 
be widely accessible.  
The market for knowledge inflows from competitors is the most imperfect and hard to 
access because of knowledge’s tacit nature, which makes its identification and transfer difficult. 
Identifying the potential value added from a piece of knowledge requires substantial interaction 
between firms, which is hard to do at arms-length.  Transfer is likely to be even more 
problematic, since it may involve repeated interaction with an unwilling donor firm.  With 
unwilling donors, prices are non-existent. As a result the accessibility of knowledge outflows to 
neighboring firms will vary, with some readily gleaned by all, and others being more opaque.   
The ordering of agglomeration economies’ relative usefulness suggests that firms would 
be most wary of contributing to skilled labor pools, because these pools are easily accessed by 
competitors. In contrast, with pools of specialized suppliers and knowledge spillovers, market 
imperfections would reduce the likelihood that competitors could glean competitive advantage, 
allowing contributing firms to co-locate without significant risk. 
To address the second unresolved issue – which firm traits may be more relevant for each 
of the agglomeration economies – we draw upon prior research. Following Shaver and Flyer, we   11   
expect that larger firms will make larger contributions to pools of skilled labor and specialized 
suppliers because they employ more workers and engage in more supplier activity. Similarly, 
following Alcácer and Chung, we expect that firms with greater technical capabilities will 
engage in more R&D activity than other firms, making  them more likely to contribute 
knowledge outflows.   
The relative value of each agglomeration economy, firm heterogeneity (firm size and 
technical capability), and agglomeration economy heterogeneity (whether the market for the 
corresponding factor is more or less imperfect) will lead to different firm behavior. Larger firms 
will be more wary of  thick labor markets  because labor pools are easy for competitors to 
penetrate. In contrast, specialized suppliers and knowledge inflows are harder to leverage, 
making it less risky for larger or more technically advanced firms to co-locate with competitors. 
Stated more formally, we expect: 
H2a. Economically larger firms will be less attracted to skilled labor (share of same 
industry employment).  
H2b. Economically larger firms will be more attracted to specialized suppliers (share of 
supplier industries employment).  
H2c. Technical-leader firms will be more attracted to potential knowledge spillovers 
(share of industry R&D activity). 
3. Data 
To assess the implications of our framework for firm behavior towards agglomeration 
economies, we examine how variation across locations in share of same-industry employment, 
supplier-industry employment, and industry R&D activity affects firms’ location choices. To 
explain location choice as a function of both location-specific and firm-level traits, we draw 
upon several data sources.   12   
Our dependent variable, the location within the U.S. of first-time foreign entrants, is 
drawn from Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Annual Transactions, published by 
the International Trade Administration (ITA). We use only transactions in the continental U.S. 
with SIC codes in manufacturing (all four-digit SIC industries between 2000 and 3999) for 1985 
through 1994.
6
We restrict our sample to transactions by firms that are first-time entrants because prior 
investments can influence subsequent location choices and create dependence among 
observations for the same firm.
  We focus on manufacturing industries, rather than agriculture, mining or 
services, because we expect the impact of agglomeration economies on firms’ location decisions 
to be the greatest. 
7  We also restrict ourselves to firms making greenfield 
investments (excluding those that enter through acquisitions) so that we might observe firms 
making the least-constrained location choices.
8 We then match firms making these transactions 
to their accounting information from Worldscope. Restricting ourselves to first-time, greenfield 
entries by firms with publicly-available accounting information yields a sample of 657 
investment transactions.
9
                                                 
6 The data became available electronically in 1985; ITA stopped collecting it in 1994. The ITA provides 
investments’ location data, four-digit SIC code, foreign investor’s name and country of origin, transaction value and 
mode of entry. Kogut and Chang (1991) and Chung and Alcácer (2002) use this dataset to construct either their 
dependent variables or focal independent variables. 
 The five, 4-digit SIC industries that receive the most transactions are 
3714 (automotive components), 2821 (plastics/materials), 3674 (semiconductors), and 2819 
(industrial inorganic chemicals) with 49, 21, 17 and 14 transactions respectively. 
7 To determine first-time entrant status, we review inward investment data back to 1975. We exclude transactions 
where a firm invests in the same industry as prior transactions, but include transactions when a firm invests in a 
different 4-digit industry from all prior investments. 
8 This is consistent with Shaver and Flyer (2000) and Alcácer and Chung (2007), both of whom use only greenfield 
investments. 
9 These transactions are made by 500 unique firms. We include in our definition of first-time entrants additional 
entries from the same parent firm if it made those investments in different 4-digit industries than all prior entries.   13   
For each transaction, investment location can be defined broadly (the Pacific Northwest, 
New England), or more narrowly (the Bay Area, the Boston metropolitan area). In an effort to 
identify  geographic areas that mimic economic activity rather than state or administrative 
boundaries, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defined 170 economic areas spanning the 
continental U.S.
10
For our first location-specific independent variable, we use %_industry_employment, the 
percentage of workers in a given industry present in each economic area, a variable that is widely 
used in recent papers looking at the geographic concentration of U.S. manufacturing industries. 
A location with a higher portion of existing-industry employment must have a greater amount of 
skilled labor with industry-specific attributes. We aggregate employment per industry-year from 
the county level to the economic area level using the definition of economic areas provided by 
the BEA. This, as well as all our focal variables, varies by economic area, industry, and year.  
 Each economic area consists of at least one node (a metropolitan or densely 
populated area that serves as center of economic activity) and the surrounding counties that are 
economically related to the node(s). Commuting patterns are the main factor used to determine 
economic relationships among counties. Each economic area includes, as far as possible, both the 
work site and residence of its labor force. Figure 2 shows the location of transactions in our 
sample. 
Second, we introduce %_industry_suppliers, the percentage of employment from 
supplying industries present in a given economic area.  This variable, which captures the 
existence of specialized suppliers, is constructed using the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of 
the U.S. for 1992 from the Department of Commerce. The input-output accounts provide the 
types and amounts of commodities made by all industries, as well as which commodities, in what 
                                                 
10 The BEA introduced economic areas in 1977 and redefined them in 1983 and 1995 to adjust for changes in 
commuter patterns across time. We use the 1995 definition.   14   
amounts, each industry uses. Using these commodities and quantities, we determine the fraction 
of inputs from all other industries used by each focal industry.
11
For our third location-specific focal measure, we use %_industry_patents. We use 
patenting activity to proxy for potential knowledge spillovers similar to Ellison, Glaeser, and 
Kerr (2007) and Alcácer and Chung (2007). We calculate patent stocks by industry, economic 
area, source and year using patent data from the Micropatent dataset, which contains all 
information listed on the front page of every U.S. patent granted since  1975. We use four 
variables to characterize patents: inventor location (for economic area), technological class and 
subclass (for industry), and filing date (for year). The dataset provides 499,271 patents whose 
first inventors are located in the U.S. and whose application dates fall between 1985 and 1994.  
 Then, to get our industry-
economic area-year level measures, we multiply these fractions by the corresponding percents of 
industry employment by economic area and then sum across all industries to get percent of 
related supplying-industry employment. While a focal industry can potentially be fed by many 
supplying industries, we limit ourselves to each focal industry’s top ten supplying industries in 
constructing this measure, while excluding the focal industry itself as one of the top input 
providers (since we already explicitly capture this contribution in %_industry_employment). 
These top ten supplying industries account for 63% of all inputs for the industries where firms in 
our sample invest. 
The location of a patent is determined by the address of its first inventor. Most patents list 
one inventor; when multiple inventors are listed they tend to locate in the same economic area. 
Since we need information about cities and states to map locations to economic areas, we 
                                                 
11 Due to the I-O accounts being commodity based, we are unable to match some commodities to SIC industries, 
resulting in the loss of some commodity flows in determining intra-industry supply linkages. Also when 
constructing the similar %_industry_buyers measure as a control variable, additional losses occur. Commodities can 
also be exported or consumed by federal, state, and local government. We exclude these “final use” categories from 
being considered as buying industries since an appropriate geographic location of such buyers is problematic.   15   
exclude patents for which this information is not available, yielding a sample of 496,275 
locations, representing 99% of the patents granted to assignees in the U.S. that were applied for 
between 1985 and 1994. 
We map technological classes and subclasses onto industries using a concordance that 
links the International Patent Classification (IPC) system to the U.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system at the four-digit SIC level (see Silverman (1999)  for more 
information). Alternatively, we use the “Concordance Between the Standard Industrial Code 
(SIC) Classification System and the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) System” issued in January 
2002 by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
12
Finally, we identify the time dimension based on when the patent application was filed. 
The application date is the closest available to the generation of an innovation. We also calculate 
stock using the date the patent was granted, with very similar results. With economic area, 
industry, and year defined for each patent, we calculate patent stocks with different time lengths 
(three-, five-,  and seven-year averages preceding the focal year) to smooth possible yearly 
fluctuations and to capture continuity in technological activity. Results are similar using any of 
the averages; subsequent results are based upon three-year averages. We then use these three-
year averages to calculate percentages by economic area, industry, and year. 
  
Among these three focal measures, %_ind_employment  and %_ind_patents often take on 
a value of zero. This is because not every industry has direct employment or research in every 
part of the country; in contrast, a focal industry draws from many supplier industries that on 
average end up covering the entire country. At our economic area-industry-year level of analysis, 
                                                 
12 Although these two methods of mapping patents to industries yield very similar stocks per industry, we use the 
IPC alternative because the USPTO concordance is only at a 2/3-digit SIC level versus the IPC concordance, which 
generates stocks at a 4-digit level.   16   
we have 72,790 cells.
13
For our first firm-specific trait, firm technical capabilities, we use R&D intensity 
measures (R&D spending scaled by sales) obtained from Worldscope.
 With %_ind_employment 20,907 cells (28.7%) take on a value of zero; 
while, with %_ind_patents, 56,124 cells (77.1%) take on a value of zero. Aware that such a 
distribution of values cannot be well represented by a single continuous measure, we introduce a 
dummy variable to indicate which economic  area-industry-year cells take on zero values: 
%_ind_employment_zero  and  %_ind_patents_zero. These dummy variables should take on 
strongly negative values – the lack of any direct employment or research activity will make a 
location much less attractive for a potential entrant. 
14 To classify firms as 
technical leaders or laggards, we use the year of entry and compare each firm’s R&D intensity to 
the average R&D intensity for all U.S. firms in the same 4-digit industry.
15 Using industry-year 
R&D intensity data that was drawn from Compustat, we identify quartiles of R&D intensity. A 
firm whose R&D efforts would place it in the top quartile of R&D intensity in the U.S. is 
designated a leader firm; a firm whose R&D efforts are below the top quartile of U.S. firms is 
designated a laggard firm. We use the quartile definition instead of the mean or median because 
the R&D intensity of all foreign entrants to the U.S. is quite high and using a lower threshold 
would lead to most entrants being defined as leaders.
16
                                                 
13 While there are 337,850 total cells possible (233 4-digit industries x 10 years x 145 economic areas), there are not 
entries into all industries in all years. On average across industries, there is only entry in 2.15 of the possible 10 
years. 
 
14 Most first-time entrants are in the same industry as their parents. From our sample, 63% of all entries are in the 
same 4-digit code as their parent’s primary 4-digit SIC and 93% are in the same 3-digit code as the parent. 
15 We use firms in the U.S. as our comparison group given our interest in location behavior among first-time entrants 
to strategically benefit from agglomeration economies. The bulk of creation and maintenance of agglomeration 
economies is going to come from the presence of proximate U.S. firms. 
16 Consistent with the internalization theory of foreign direct investment, we would expect foreign entrants to be 
large and R&D intense relative to incumbents encountered in the host country. These are the firms that were 
successful at home and decided to use their existing capabilities more widely.     17   
For our second firm-specific trait, firm economic size, we use a measure of total firm 
assets, also obtained from Worldscope. To classify firms as economically large or small, we 
compare each firm’s total assets to the total assets for all U.S. firms in the same 4-digit industry. 
A firm whose total assets are above the top quartile of U.S. firms is designated a large firm; a 
firm whose total assets are less than the top quartile of U.S. firms is designated a small firm.
17
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In addition to these focal variables, we need to control for other characteristics, such as 
access to consumers, market growth, and low-priced inputs such as land, etc. Collecting an 
exhaustive set of these variables at the economic-area level for all industries is practically 
impossible, so we use three variables to proxy for the host of attributes that attract entrants. 
Our first and second control variables are establishment_growth and employment_growth. 
Both variables control for location-industry-time specific heterogeneity that can influence 
location decisions. Our establishment and employment data are drawn from County Business 
Patterns reports from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1985 to 1994. 
Our third control variable is %_industry_buyers, which is constructed in a similar manner 
to the focal variable %_industry_suppliers, but uses the input-output tables to identify 
purchasing/buying industries of the focal industry. %_industry_buyers is an important control 
because proximity to buyers should be an important consideration when firms decide where to 
locate.  Since  an industry’s buyers and suppliers are likely to be somewhat overlapped 
geographically, including suppliers only would create a classic omitted-variables problem: any 
                                                 
17 Optimally we would use the entrant’s establishment size, since it is the economic size of the investment that is 
contributing to and drawing upon agglomeration economies. However, entrant size is only intermittently reported 
(about 40% of the time) and is noisy itself since a firm might subsequently add to an initial investment. Instead of 
introducing this additional source of noise and losing many observations, we use parent-firm-level information for 
both entrants and U.S. comparators. While noisy, this measure performs well – consistent with our theoretic 
expectations – in our subsequent analysis.   18   
significance of the omitted-buyer’s proximity would inappropriately load onto the included 
measure for supplier proximity.  
Finally, following Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), we use alternative specific constants 
(ASCs) (dummy variables per economic area) to capture time-invariant attributes that may be 
attracting entrants. Examples of attributes captured by ASCs would be land area, population 
density, right-to-work laws, tax rates, and coastal location. To the extent that such attributes are 
relatively constant across time, they are reflected by the ASCs.  
4. Method 
We examine the attractiveness of same-industry employment, supplier-industry 
employment, and industry R&D activity, as well as how this attractiveness varies with firm 
heterogeneity.  
We model the location-choice process, where firms choose one of 170 economic areas, 
through a conditional-logit model as described by McFadden (1974). Conditional logit has been 
used extensively for cases where choices are made from a large set of possible geographical 
locations (Head et al., 1995; Chung and Alcácer, 2002).  
The conditional logistic regression is similar to the ordinary logistic regression models 
except that the data occur in groups. The idea is to fit a logistic model that explains why a given 
choice has a positive outcome in a group (choice set) conditional on the other existing 
alternatives in the choice set. The conditional-logit model is specified as follows. Let Vij 
represent the value to firm i of choosing location j. Vij depends on location characteristics that 
vary by industry, Xij, according to: 
  Vij = β’xij + eij  (1)   19   
Let Yij be our dependent variable equal to 1 if firm i chooses location j and 0 otherwise. 
Firm i will choose location j if Vij > Vik for all k ≠ j. Assuming that eij are independent and 
identically distributed with Type I Extreme Value Distribution, then the probability that location 
i is chosen is 
P(Yij=1) = P(Vij > Vik for all k ≠j)    (2) 
 
where k = 1 to m are all locations entered by at least one firm between 1985 and 1994. 
Since 25 economic areas are never chosen in our sample, our choice set is reduced from 171 to 
145 potential locations. While dropping alternatives might seem to bias our results, a central 
feature of the conditional logit is its independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property – 
the ratio of two alternatives’ probabilities of being chosen is the same regardless of what other 
alternatives are available (or unavailable). For example, Train (2003) shows that estimated model 
parameters  are consistent when using only a subset of alternatives in the decision making 
process. 
Note that the conditional-logit model focuses on location traits instead of firm traits. Firm 
characteristics would be invariant within a choice set, appearing in both the numerator and 
denominator of equation 2 and dropping from the estimation. Chooser’s traits can be modeled by 
interacting terms (multiplying economic area traits by firm traits) or by splitting the sample into 
sub-samples according to specific firm traits. We choose the second option for two reasons. First, 
it offers a more parsimonious presentation of the results because it uses fewer regressors than 
models with interaction effects; second,  it avoids numerous cross-terms that are difficult to 
interpret with non-linear models. For example, Ai and Norton (2003) find that “the magnitude of 
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term, can  be of opposite sign, and its statistical significance is not calculated by standard 
software.” Also, while interaction effects are by definition co-linear with the variables being 
interacted, splitting samples does not increase co-linearity levels.  Finally, using sub-samples 
allows all variables in the model to vary for each sub-sample, rather than using interaction terms 
where only those variables explicitly interacted will vary. 
5. Results 
Table 2 provides an overview of each agglomeration economy’s attractiveness. The first 
column is a benchmark specification of control variables. The subsequent columns introduce 
each independent variable separately.  
        [Table 2 about here]  
Focusing on the measures for agglomeration economies, across all models, we see that 
%_ind_employment is consistently positive and significant. Including the zero dummy variable, 
%_ind_employment_zero  drops the magnitude of %_ind_employment  slightly, but otherwise 
remains very significant. Assessing the improvement from including %_ind_employment_zero, 
we look at the difference in log likelihood between columns 2 and 3: -2497.01 vs. -2476.21 for a 
difference of 20.80, which is significant at better than a 1% level.  %_ind_suppliers  is  also 
consistently positive and significant across all models. For %_ind_patents, while consistently 
positive, it is only significant in column 5 before %_ind_patents_zero is included. Looking at the 
difference in log likelihood between columns 5 and 6, including %_ind_patents_zero does not 
significantly improve overall model fit.
18
                                                 
18 In later specifications found in Table 3, we continue to include %_ind_patents_zero because it occasionally does 
have significant statistical effect, and we want to avoid an omitted variables problem in later specifications. 
  We investigate the marginal significance of 
%_ind_patents further by separating out industries that are more R&D intensive later in the 
paper.   21   
Our main interest in this table is to compare the economies’ magnitudes of effect. To do 
so, we use the odds-ratios, which due to the conditional logit’s form are exponentiated values of 
the coefficient estimates. Using odd-ratios’ values from column 6, we  see that 
%_ind_employment and %_ind_suppliers have similar magnitudes of effect; their odds-ratios are 
1.090 and 1.089 vs. 1.007 for %_ind_patents. Since the corresponding independent variables are 
expressed as percentages, the 1.090 indicates that if an economic area had a 1% increase in 
%_industry employment this would lead to a 9.0% increase in likelihood of being chosen. The 
odds-ratios result and corresponding Welch’s t-tests for differences indicate that skilled labor and 
specialized suppliers are of about the same attractiveness for firms, and that both are at least ten 
times more attractive than potential knowledge spillovers. This ordering is consistent with 
hypothesis H1. 
Of note also is the odds-ratio for the zero employment dummy variable, 
%_ind_employment_zero. The odds-ratio from column 6 is 0.250, which means that an economic 
area that has no relevant employment is four times less likely of being chosen relative to if it had 
any industry employment. 
Having established relative attractiveness across agglomeration economies, we turn to 
firms’ strategic response. Table 3 splits the sample along the two key dimensions of firm 
heterogeneity: firm economic size and firm R&D intensity. Column 1 is again the baseline model 
of all firms – identical to that shown in Table 2, column 6. Columns 2 and 3 present the results 
for the split by firm economic size, while columns 4 and 5 present the results for the split by firm 
R&D intensity. 
        [Table 3 about here]    22   
Looking at %_ind_employment in columns 2 and 3 where the firms are split into those 
that are economically large and economically small, the coefficient estimates are both positive 
and significant. Of note, the coefficient for the large-firm group is substantially smaller than for 
the small-firm group: 0.0757 versus 0.1284 (using Welch’s t-test, this difference is significant at 
more than a 1% level). The corresponding odds-ratios (1.079 and 1.137) suggest that larger firms 
are roughly 40% less attracted than small firms to locations with skilled labor. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H2a – larger firms would be less attracted to locations with skilled 
labor. Another consistent explanation is that larger firms are better able to attract workers to 
wherever they locate and can be less concerned with existing pools of labor. Our difference 
between large and small firms is also consistent with Shaver and Flyer (2000), who find that 
large establishments are about 40% less attracted to locations thick with same-industry 
establishments.
19
Also looking at %_ind_suppliers in columns 2 and 3, the coefficient estimates for large 
and small firms are starkly different: positive and significant for large firms, but slightly negative 
and non-significant for small firms. This suggests that only large firms are drawn to pools of 
specialized suppliers. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H2b –  limited accessibility 
reduces concerns about aiding competitors because they may have difficulty leveraging other 
firms’ supplier base. As a result, the greater contributors – large firms in this case – can enjoy 
agglomeration economies without concern over aiding smaller competitors. 
  
The lack of significance for %_ind_suppliers with small firms is somewhat surprising –  
we might expect such firms to rely on the existing infrastructure of suppliers. Among this 
population at least, it appears that small firms’ location choices are driven not by the presence of 
                                                 
19 From Shaver and Flyer (2000): column 1 of Table 5 on page 1189, comparing the estimate for “PROPORTION” 
of 11.82 to the estimate for “PROPORTION x LARGE ESTABLISHMENT” of -4.79.   23   
suppliers, but by the availability of skilled labor and potential knowledge inflows from 
competitors (the coefficient estimates for %_ind_employment and %_ind_patents are strongly 
significant). Both of these effects may indicate the importance of scale. Small firms do not 
account for enough economic activity to encourage workers to relocate, making them more 
dependent upon existing pools of labor. Similarly, small firms do not perform enough technical 
activity to keep pace with changing technologies and thus have to rely on the proximate activity 
of other firms as well. 
Finally we look at %_ind_patents in columns 4 and 5, where firms are split into those 
that are more and less R&D intensive. Here again we expect to find that R&D-intensive firms are 
more attracted to R&D-intensive locations than firms less reliant upon R&D, but find little 
evidence of variation. Coefficient estimates for both leader and laggard firms are positive but not 
significant. This lack of significance is similar to prior research by Alcácer and Chung (2007), 
who  find  that  R&D-intensive firms are more attracted to potential  knowledge spillover. 
However,  the  2007 study disaggregates by knowledge source (academic, industry, and 
government) and amount (high, low, and zero) to show several strong relationships. We do not 
pursue similar disaggregation, because our interest is in assessing firms’ attraction to each of 
Marshall’s three agglomeration economies instead of going into greater depth with a single one. 
These results for potential knowledge spillover, combined with our findings for the other 
economies, suggest that firms’ considering new locations will place more value on labor and 
suppliers than they place on potential knowledge inflows from competitors.  
In summary, our results show that %_ind_employment and %_ind_suppliers are several 
times  more attractive to firms choosing locations than %_ind_patents. Firms vary in their 
response to these economies depending upon whether they are economically large or small and   24   
whether they can access and make use of the factor inputs available in a particular 
agglomeration. Consistent with concerns about aiding proximate competitors, large firms tend to 
be less attracted to locations with high %_ind_employment. In contrast, large firms appear more 
attracted to locations with high %_ind_suppliers, which is consistent with the limited usefulness 
of contributions to pools of supplier activity. Relative to these distinct location behaviors, firm 
response to potential knowledge spillovers is minor.  
6. Robustness 
Before settling on these results, we conduct additional tests to assess their robustness. In 
particular for H1 – skilled labor and specialized suppliers being more attractive than potential 
knowledge inflows – the strategic value of each agglomeration economy may vary based upon 
how intensively it is used in certain industries. For example, firms in labor-intensive industries 
might place a greater emphasis on geographic concentrations of skilled labor than on specialized 
suppliers or potential knowledge inflows. Similarly, firms in supplier-intensive industries might 
be more drawn to supplier activity; or firms in R&D-intensive industries might be more drawn to 
knowledge inflows. As such, we split our sample by labor intensity, extent of suppliers used, and 
R&D intensity. 
To assign industries into high and low categories for labor intensity, we use the National 
Bureau of Economic Research’s Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database, which provides 
industries’ value-added as well as the inputs used in production. To determine labor intensity, we 
use an industry’s ratio of total payroll divided by total value-added, averaged for the nine years 
of our investigation, 1985-1994. We designate industries above the median as labor intensive and 
those below as not. To assign industries to high supplier-use or low supplier-use, we use the 
Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the U.S. for 1992 from the Department of Commerce,   25   
which reports for each industry the proportion of value coming from supplying industries. We 
also split industries into those that are more and less knowledge-intense. To assign industries to 
high-tech and low-tech categories, we follow the OECD classification from the report OECD 
Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard  (1999). Labor-intensive transactions make up 
45.7% of all transactions, while 44.6% of transactions are classified as high supplier-use, and 
60.9% of transactions are classified as high-tech. Results appear in Table 4 below. 
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In Table 4, column 1 is the baseline specification – identical to that shown in Table 2, 
column 6. Columns 2 and 3 present the results for the split by industry labor-intensity, columns 4 
and 5 are for the split by industry- supplier-intensity, and columns 6 and 7 present results for the 
split by industry R&D-intensity.  
Looking at %_ind_employment in columns 2 and 3, we see that both coefficient estimates 
are statistically significant, but they differ in magnitude. As we would expect, the attraction to 
pools of labor in labor-intensive industries is greater: 0.0979 vs. 0.0756. This difference in 
coefficient estimates is strongly statistically significant using Welch’s t-test. Also of interest is 
how the coefficients for industry suppliers and patents differ for these two industry groups. With 
labor-intensive industries, only industry employment is a draw; suppliers and patents are strong 
draws in less labor-intensive industries. This is sensible, since by definition those two categories 
would be of greater importance in less labor-intensive industries. Looking at the odds-ratios even 
in this less labor-intensive group, the draw of employment and suppliers is still much greater 
than it is for patents: 1.079 and 1.207 versus 1.018. 
Looking at %_ind_suppliers in columns 4 and 5, we see that the coefficient estimates are 
substantially different. For firms in high supplier-use industries, the estimate is positive and   26   
significant, while for firms in the low supplier-use group, the estimate is positive but not 
significant. The coefficient estimate for the high supplier-use industry group is also substantially 
larger than the baseline all-industry sample: 0.1504 vs. 0.0857. Analogously, the odds-ratio is 
also greater: 1.162 versus 1.089. Unsurprisingly, these differences suggest that the attractiveness 
of agglomerated supplier activity is more important for firms in industries that rely heavily on 
suppliers. 
Looking at %_ind_patents in columns 6 and 7, the coefficient estimates are both positive 
but not significant. While we might expect a positive and significant estimate for the high R&D-
intensity group, this basic split is perhaps still too aggregated to reveal an effect. 
With these three industry splits, we see that even when examining industries that use 
certain inputs more intensively, hypothesis H1’s expected relationship remains – skilled labor 
and specialized suppliers are more attractive to firms than potential knowledge inflow. 
7. Conclusions 
Locations thick with similar economic activity expose firms to pools of skilled labor, 
specialized suppliers, and potential inter-firm knowledge spillovers that can provide firms with 
opportunities for competitive advantage. While certainly attractive, the draw of these 
agglomeration economies will vary. Firms contribute differentially to the formation, 
maintenance, and growth of these agglomeration economies. Each agglomeration economy also 
differs in how readily competitors can leverage contributions made by others. As a result, some 
firms must be wary of aiding their competitors by co-locating with them.  
To better understand how  firms  respond to  agglomeration economies, we develop a 
framework of three interconnecting layers. The first layer uses the long-standing literature in 
economics on production functions to establish a baseline for each agglomeration economy’s   27   
relative value; an economy should be more valuable if it provides factor inputs that firms use 
more intensively. The second layer modifies this baseline by examining whether particular 
economies are location-specific; firms will have more incentive to co-locate when an economy’s 
factor inputs cannot be leveraged from afar. The final layer addresses why individual firms vary 
in their propensity to co-locate with competitors based upon both firm heterogeneity and 
agglomeration economy heterogeneity; firms that contribute greater amounts to agglomeration 
economies may be wary of co-locating, though this concern will be reduced when competitors 
cannot make use of those contributions due to more imperfect markets. 
The framework generates two novel predictions. First, pools of skilled labor and 
specialized suppliers will be more attractive to firms than potential knowledge inflows. Second, 
the risk of aiding competitors might be reduced by an agglomeration economy’s relative 
usefulness. Large firms might shy away from locations with skilled labor, because labor pools 
are easy for competitors to tap. The same large firms might be less concerned about enriching 
local supplier networks, because supplier networks are of more limited usefulness to competitors. 
Similarly, the limited usefulness of leaked knowledge would allow technical leaders to locate 
with less-advanced competitors.  
We find empirical results consistent with the first prediction and somewhat consistent 
with the second. For first-time foreign entrants to the U.S. making greenfield investments in 
1985-1994, we find that industry employment and supplier activity are about ten times more 
attractive than industry patent stocks, suggesting that firms, on average, place more value on 
pools of skilled labor and specialized suppliers than on potential knowledge  inflows from 
competitors. The priority placed on labor and suppliers persists even for industries that are more 
R&D intensive. Introducing key dimensions of firms’ heterogeneity reveals that economically   28   
larger firms are less attracted to industry employment, but are more attracted to supplier industry 
activity.  This paired finding suggests that concern about aiding competitors is strong when 
competitors can leverage agglomeration economies for strategic advantage, and weak when they 
cannot.  
For the strategy literature,  our intent is to provide a comprehensive, consistent, and 
cohesive lens to view firms’ location behavior in the presence of Marshall’s three agglomeration 
economies. The framework separates each economy from the collective, allowing us to better 
understand the variety of firm responses composing strategic co-location. This structure both 
orients and integrates extant research, allowing us to resolve some apparent contradictions. For 
example, Shaver and Flyer (2000) find that new entrants might shy away from locating with 
competitors, while Alcácer and Chung (2007) find that new entrants might be drawn to 
competitors. Considering their studies in the context of our framework, there are two key 
differences: (1) Shaver and Flyer examine the set of three agglomeration economies collectively, 
while Alcácer and Chung only look at knowledge spillovers; and (2) concerns about aiding 
competitors predominate for the three agglomeration economies in aggregate, but wane when 
looking only at knowledge spillovers. 
Our findings also contribute to the economics literature on agglomeration. Work by 
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) make great strides in 
distinguishing  and prioritizing Marshall’s agglomeration economies  by examining long-term 
incumbents. Both state that analysis of recent entrants’ agglomeration behavior is critical for 
addressing alternate explanations not in line with their theoretic explanations. We specifically 
examine  firm-level entry and find  results prioritizing Marshall’s externalities  that are very   29   
consistent with these studies, namely, that access to skilled labor and specialized suppliers has a 
greater impact on location decisions than access to knowledge inflows from competitors.  
A number of caveats for our results remain. Distinguishing the three agglomeration 
economies from one another depends upon our measures being strong enough to capture – and 
yet sharp enough to separate – the distinct effects. Undoubtedly there is some overlap among our 
measures. For example, from a theoretic standpoint, skilled labor is one of the main conduits 
through which knowledge would spill. While non-overlapped measures are desirable, we are 
hard-pressed to find sharper measures, especially when the economies are theoretically 
entangled. We are not unique in this area; the research on which we build faces the same 
measurement challenge. Another limitation is our particular context of new entrants into the 
U.S., which certainly reduces the generality of our results. The idiosyncrasies of entering firms’ 
motives, which are driven by the prevailing economic topology, are likely specific to the U.S.  
Overall, our framework suggests how firms would react to each agglomeration economy. 
We theoretically and empirically separate the set, and show that firms’ location choices balance 
the perceived risk of aiding competitors with a recognition that some agglomeration economies 
will be of limited use to others. This integrative framework is important since understanding 
firms’ behavior towards these agglomeration economies is a large component of what drives 
firms’ location strategy, which can, in turn, be a source of competitive advantage.   30   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of economic areas characteristics (1985-1994 for 145 economic areas)*
Variable Source N** Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Location-specific variables employment_growth County Business Patterns (BEA) percentage 72,790     0.361 23.155 -0.999 6094.0
establishment_growth County Business Patterns (BEA) percentage 72,790     0.029 0.267 -0.833 26.0
% buyers County Business Patterns (BEA) percentage 72,790     0.671 1.294 0.015 13.2
% industry employment County Business Patterns (BEA) percentage 72,790     0.671 1.973 0.000 59.9
% supplying industries County Business Patterns (BEA) percentage 72,790     0.672 1.261 0.000 19.3
% industry patents (3-year stock) Micropatent percentage 72,790     0.635 3.192 0.000 100.0
* the continental US is composed of 170 economic areas; 25 economic areas do not receive any transactions
** 145 economic areas x 10 years x 233 industries = 337,850, but not all industries had entries in all years leaving 72,790
Descriptive statistics for foreign investment transactions (1985-1994)
Variable Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm-specific variables Economically Large Worldscope, Compustat dummy 657 0.732 0.443 0 1
R&D Leader Worldscope, Compustat dummy 657 0.460 0.499 0 1
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Table 2: Attractiveness of Agglomeration Economies
Conditional logit models of locations' attributes affecting likelihood of being chosen
Dependent variable:  baseline agglomeration economies
   entry in 1 economic area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Econ. Area dummies included included included included included included
employment_growth -0.1314 * -0.1355 * -0.1456 ** -0.1449 ** -0.1439 ** -0.1425 **
(0.068) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
[0.877] [0.873] [0.865] [0.865] [0.866] [0.867]
establishment_growth 0.1903 0.2364 0.2069 0.2029 0.2060 0.2027
(0.166) (0.171) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
[1.210] [1.267] [1.230] [1.225] [1.229] [1.225]
%_industry_buyers 1.0884 *** 0.4979 *** 0.5050 *** 0.4590 *** 0.4517 *** 0.4507 ***
(0.126) (0.139) (0.138) (0.139) (0.138) (0.139)
[2.970] [1.645] [1.657] [1.582] [1.571] [1.569]
%_industry_employment 0.0958 *** 0.0914 *** 0.0877 *** 0.0867 *** 0.0862 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
[1.101] [1.096] [1.092] [1.091] [1.090]
%_ind_employment_zero -1.4138 *** -1.4050 *** -1.4023 *** -1.3849 ***
(0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.258)
[0.243] [0.245] [0.246] [0.250]
%_industry_suppliers 0.0886 *** 0.0876 *** 0.0857 ***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
[1.093] [1.092] [1.089]






Observations 95265 95265 95265 95265 95265 95265
   no. of investments 657 657 657 657 657 657
   no. of alternative choices 145 145 145 145 145 145
Log Likelihood -2561.12 -2497.01 -2476.21 -2472.22 -2470.67 -2469.82
Improvement in Model Fit Test
   comparing vs (1) vs (2) vs (3) vs (4) vs (5)
   difference in Log Likelihood 64.11 20.80 3.99 1.55 0.86
   additional d.o.f. 1 1 1 1 1
   Chi-square test of ∆LogL 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.005 *** 0.079 * 0.191
Pseudo R-squared 0.217 0.236 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.245
standard error in parentheses, odds-ratio in square brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for 2-tailed tests  35   
Table 3: Strategic Response to Agglomeration Economies
Conditional logit models of locations' attributes affecting likelihood of being chosen
baseline sample split by firm sample split by firm
Dependent variable:  economic size R&D intensity
   entry in 1 economic area all firms large firms small firms leaders laggards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Econ. Area dummies included included included included included
employment_growth -0.1425 ** -0.1998 ** -0.0555 -0.2239 * -0.0933
(0.070) (0.096) (0.094) (0.124) (0.079)
[0.867] [0.819] [0.946] [0.799] [0.911]
establishment_growth 0.2027 0.2127 0.2309 0.1619 0.2563
(0.167) (0.199) (0.307) (0.260) (0.216)
[1.225] [1.237] [1.260] [1.176] [1.292]
%_industry_buyers 0.4507 *** 0.5229 *** 0.2584 0.4148 ** 0.4875 **
(0.139) (0.175) (0.252) (0.205) (0.194)
[1.569] [1.687] [1.295] [1.514] [1.628]
%_industry_employment 0.0862 *** 0.0757 *** 0.1284 *** 0.0704 *** 0.0971 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011)
[1.090] [1.079] [1.137] [1.073] [1.102]
%_ind_employment_zero -1.3849 *** -1.3567 *** -1.4522 *** -1.3904 *** -1.3664 ***
(0.258) (0.302) (0.494) (0.405) (0.335)
[0.250] [0.258] [0.234] [0.249] [0.255]
%_industry_suppliers 0.0857 *** 0.1090 *** -0.0099 0.1084 ** 0.0729 *
(0.030) (0.034) (0.072) (0.052) (0.038)
[1.089] [1.115] [0.990] [1.114] [1.076]
%_industry_patents 0.0065 -0.0027 0.0195 *** 0.0023 0.0094
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
[1.007] [0.997] [1.020] [1.002] [1.009]
%_ind_patents_zero -0.1633 -0.2970 ** 0.1833 -0.3011 -0.0610
(0.125) (0.147) (0.248) (0.191) (0.169)
[0.849] [0.743] [1.201] [0.740] [0.941]
Observations 95265 69745 25520 43790 51475
   no. of investments 657 481 176 302 355
   no. of alternative choices 145 145 145 145 145
Log Likelihood -2469.82 -1793.06 -615.37 -1107.96 -1286.44
Pseudo R-squared 0.245 0.251 0.297 0.263 0.272
standard error in parentheses, odds-ratio in square brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for 2-tailed tests  36 
Table 4: Attractiveness of Agglomeration Economies - Split by Industry Intensity
Conditional logit models of locations' attributes affecting likelihood of being chosen
baseline sample split by industry sample split by industry sample split by industry
Dependent variable:  all labor intensity supplier intensity R&D intensity
   entry in 1 economic area industries high use low use high use low use high R&D low R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Econ. Area dummies included included included included included included included
employment_growth -0.1425 ** -0.1700 -0.1194 -0.1184 -0.1624 -0.1674 * -0.1127
(0.070) (0.115) (0.089) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.097)
[0.867] [0.844] [0.887] [0.888] [0.850] [0.846] [0.893]
establishment_growth 0.2027 0.1846 0.2423 0.0767 0.3063 0.1219 0.2858
(0.167) (0.261) (0.224) (0.259) (0.217) (0.227) (0.244)
[1.225] [1.203] [1.274] [1.080] [1.358] [1.130] [1.331]
%_industry_buyers 0.4507 *** 0.4763 * 0.3845 ** 0.5658 *** 0.4477 * 0.4704 *** 0.0983
(0.139) (0.269) (0.176) (0.193) (0.230) (0.164) (0.290)
[1.569] [1.610] [1.469] [1.761] [1.565] [1.601] [1.103]
%_industry_employment 0.0862 *** 0.0979 *** 0.0756 *** 0.0650 *** 0.0972 *** 0.0979 *** 0.0673 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
[1.090] [1.103] [1.079] [1.067] [1.102] [1.103] [1.070]
%_ind_employment_zero -1.3849 *** -1.1669 *** -1.4973 *** -1.8785 *** -0.9978 *** -1.4853 *** -1.2530 ***
(0.258) (0.386) (0.347) (0.436) (0.325) (0.381) (0.353)
[0.250] [0.311] [0.224] [0.153] [0.369] [0.226] [0.286]
%_industry_suppliers 0.0857 *** 0.0354 0.1883 *** 0.1504 *** 0.0554 0.0423 0.1683 ***
(0.030) (0.040) (0.056) (0.056) (0.038) (0.046) (0.047)
[1.089] [1.036] [1.207] [1.162] [1.057] [1.043] [1.183]
%_industry_patents 0.0065 -0.0069 0.0174 ** 0.0177 * 0.0006 0.0059 0.0154
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014)
[1.007] [0.993] [1.018] [1.018] [1.001] [1.006] [1.016]
%_ind_patents_zero -0.1633 -0.2798 -0.0124 -0.0092 -0.2594 -0.1916 -0.1757
(0.125) (0.192) (0.170) (0.183) (0.176) (0.175) (0.185)
[0.849] [0.756] [0.988] [0.991] [0.772] [0.826] [0.839]
Observations 95265 43500 51765 42485 52780 58000 37265
   no. of investments 657 300 357 293 364 400 257
   no. of alternative choices 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
Log Likelihood -2469.82 -1072.57 -1322.31 -1072.85 -1332.17 -1448.11 -920.72
Pseudo R-squared 0.245 0.282 0.256 0.264 0.265 0.273 0.280
standard error in parentheses, odds-ratio in square brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for 2-tailed tests  